In Just Weeks, Israel Successfully Eliminates Most of Hezbollah’s Senior Leadership, Including the Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah, Along with Dozens of Others from Mid-Level Leadership
In just a few weeks, Israel succeeded in eliminating most of the first-tier leadership of Hezbollah, including its Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah, as well as dozens of others from mid-level leadership. The major question that followed these focused security strikes was: can Hezbollah maintain its cohesion, field effectiveness, and political presence under these extraordinary circumstances?
This question is often raised after each targeted operation against senior leaders of armed Islamic groups in Iraq, Syria, Afghanistan, Yemen, Africa, and elsewhere. The answers have always been varied, but the historical evidence and practical experiences support the assumption that neutralizing leadership often leads to the weakening of these groups and limits their threat. However, in some exceptional cases, the opposite occurs. This is what we aim to clarify in this report.
Theoretical Debate
There is a theoretical debate and varying opinions in the literature of war and related security studies on the effectiveness of targeting leaders, and whether it plays a significant role in eliminating insurgent groups or not. A study published by the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, titled "Assessing the Success of Leadership Targeting," concluded that “the key variable in determining the effectiveness of leadership targeting is the level of institutionalization in the targeted group.” The factor of institutionalization ensures a degree of flexibility during leadership replacement and compensation processes.
The study confirmed that organizations with a strong institutional structure will only experience temporary disruption due to leadership loss, while groups that lack sufficient institutionalization are more likely to experience paralysis or even collapse when subjected to a leadership targeting campaign. The study cited examples from Iraq in 2004 and 2006. The first was Al-Qaeda in Iraq led by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, which was not significantly affected by his death in 2006 because it had introduced some level of institutionalization into its organizational structure. However, another group, the Shura Council of Mujahideen in Fallujah, completely disappeared after the neutralization of its leader, Abdullah al-Janabi, in 2005 because its entire structure relied on the leader’s presence and charisma.
Another study published by the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs emphasized that “the resilience of Islamic groups following decapitation operations is determined by two main factors: bureaucracy and social support.” It argued that some groups tend to develop a bureaucratic structure that facilitates the transfer of power, while social support provides the necessary resources for their continuation.
Rand Institute researcher Patrick Johnston argued in an extensive study analyzing 168 insurgencies from 1803 to 1999 that leadership decapitation is an effective and viable strategy that weakens insurgent organizations, tears them apart, and makes them more susceptible to defeat.
Al-Qaeda
When analyzing the activities of Al-Qaeda and its branches worldwide, we find that the “leadership decapitation” strategy has been largely successful in impacting its effectiveness and capabilities. In some cases, it has led to the complete and decisive end of certain affiliated groups, especially when the leadership involved was spiritual or foundational, making it difficult to replace them in terms of presence and influence.
The campaign launched by Al-Qaeda in Saudi Arabia in 2003 was promising in the eyes of Osama bin Laden, who allocated huge resources and conducted a massive propaganda campaign, aiming for it to transform into an armed popular insurgency to overthrow the Saudi regime. However, Al-Qaeda received a painful preemptive blow with the killing of its leader, Yusuf al-Ayiri, in June 2003. Al-Ayiri was a military leader and ideological theorist, and bin Laden had relied on his experience to implement the plan. The campaign unraveled after the death of al-Ayiri, and its loss was cemented with the killing of his successor, Abdulaziz al-Muqrin, the following year. The group ended entirely after the neutralization of all its active leadership.
The group Harakat al-Din (Al-Qaeda in Syria), even though not surrounded by Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham, has very slim chances of transforming into an influential organization in Syria. Its crisis began when the "Khorasani" group, a collection of senior leaders from Afghanistan and Iran, was completely eliminated within a few years, transforming the group into an ineffective structure.
If we reflect on all the crises Al-Qaeda has faced, we see that it has arisen after the killing of a charismatic leader who was difficult to replace. After the death of al-Zarqawi, there was a debate about the legitimacy of declaring what was then called "The Islamic State of Iraq," with the group split between those in favor of the declaration and those against it. Everyone claimed that al-Zarqawi would have supported the position had he remained alive. When Osama bin Laden was killed, ISIS emerged, with its leaders promoting that they represented bin Laden’s approach after Ayman al-Zawahiri's deviation and "his committing of violations" by agreeing to the separation of the al-Nusra Front from the Islamic State of Iraq.
The historical leaders, who transcend generations, are difficult to replace. It takes the group many years or even decades to mature replacement leaders of the same caliber. This is why Al-Qaeda has not yet managed to replace the generation of senior leaders that perished in Afghanistan, and their neutralization caused the group's decline in Afghanistan and the expansion of ISIS at its expense, such as Atiyah Allah, Abu Yahya al-Libi, Mustafa Abu Yazid, and American-born Azam, whose death in January 2015 also led to the collapse of Al-Qaeda’s media division.
In Yemen, the killing of Al-Qaeda leader Nasser al-Wahishi in June 2015 caused cracks within the organization. Perhaps the “leadership decapitation” policy succeeded in Yemen more than anywhere else. Within a few years, the United States succeeded in killing most of the organization's leaders, resulting in a climate of suspicion and distrust within the group. A sharp dispute arose about the identities of the spies who had infiltrated the organization and caused the deaths of most of its senior leaders. The group’s security apparatus launched a campaign against the suspected spies, executing significant leaders on charges of collaboration, leading to the defection of hundreds of members and leaders.
ISIS
The studies mentioned earlier in the report link the cohesion of a group after its leadership is targeted to the degree of institutionalization under which it operates, which provides some flexibility in the process of leadership transition and filling vacant leadership positions. However, what the study authors overlooked is that the complex and secretive security conditions under which these groups operate make it very difficult to establish a stable institutional structure. In fact, institutionalization is avoided as much as possible, as any minor security breach could expose the entire structure of the organization.
ISIS established an enormous institutional structure at its peak, declaring a ministerial formation, specialized bureaus, a war council, a shura council, a delegated committee, a provincial management office, follow-up committees, and more. However, as soon as its strongholds began to fall, its bureaucratic structure collapsed, and powers concentrated in the hands of a few influential men. Its crises deepened with the killing of four of its leaders in a short period.
The group found itself in a very difficult situation following the killing of its fourth leader, Abu al-Hussein al-Husseini, and prominent leader Abdul-Raouf al-Muhajir, who was responsible for the provincial management office. No leader from the founding generation was left to take over the leadership of the group, and all historical leaders had been neutralized. According to American reports, the group had no choice but to appoint a Somali leader as its new emir, though it has not dared to acknowledge this in public for fear of shocking its members and supporters.
Hezbollah may have found itself in a similar situation, losing its foundational historical cadres, although its Deputy Secretary-General, Naeem Qassem, reassured his supporters that there remains some of the founding generation within the party’s ranks.
Taliban
Sometimes, just the absence of a leader due to security reasons or their arrest throws the group into a spiral of confusion and fragmentation. When Ayman al-Zawahiri was absent for almost two years due to security and health reasons, the al-Nusra Front split, and the famous 2017 dispute erupted over the legitimacy of this split. The same happened with the Muslim Brotherhood, which is characterized by its high bureaucracy and institutionalization. The arrest of the group’s General Guide, Mohamed Badie, put the group at a crossroads, splitting it into competing factions.
The Taliban is almost the only group that was not affected by the death or killing of its leaders. In fact, its leader and founder, Mullah Omar, passed away in 2013, and only a few individuals in the leadership knew about it. The movement remained active without its field effectiveness being affected, and his death was not announced until 2015.
The reasons for this exception can be attributed to the fact that the Taliban is not an organization but a popular movement based on deep tribal roots and a popular base, which ensures its continuation and resilience. Additionally, the movement's military efforts are borne by numerous field commanders scattered across villages and rural areas. Taliban leaders, including Mullah Omar, never appeared in the media, nor did they send out video messages, and there are no recent pictures of them. Thus, they did not occupy the imagination and hearts of their followers in the same way that leaders who frequently appear in the media would, making their replacement less impactful on loyalty to the movement.
When Mullah Omar passed away in 2013, those close to him continued issuing holiday greeting statements in his name, which they had been doing for years, without anyone noticing the absence of the emir.
Thus, the difficulty in replacing a charismatic leader who has occupied the imagination of his followers for decades, like Hassan Nasrallah, becomes evident. The same happened with the Moroccan Justice and Spirituality group when its founder and former guide, Abdel-Salam Yassine, passed away in 2012. The group announced the abolition of the position of General Guide because someone like Abdel-Salam Yassine could not be replaced, and instead, the position of Secretary-General was created.