Syrians and observers of Syrian affairs are questioning the challenges of the transitional phase after the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime and the rebels taking control in Damascus. Most of the questions revolve around transitional justice, the future form of government, the status of minorities, the fate of individual freedoms, the issue of arms, foreign presence in the country, and others.
However, the question that many have overlooked is the extent to which al-Jolani can contain the jihadists and convince them that their mission in Syria has ended, and that they must integrate into the new state institutions, with its constitution, laws, and public elections. This is particularly difficult given that most of them grew up on ideologies that do not recognize modern state mechanisms in governance and public affairs management, viewing governance through a simple lens: "implementing Sharia."
The Jihadists' Rebellion
After the split between ISIS and al-Nusra, thousands of jihadists who had pledged allegiance to al-Nusra, viewing it as an al-Qaeda branch in Syria, remained critical of al-Jolani's policy of postponing aspects of Sharia. They engaged in numerous discussions, both in person and on social media, about implementing Sharia and enforcing punishments during wartime. Some of them were convinced by al-Jolani’s argument for deferring the full application of Sharia until "full empowerment," but many insisted that Sharia should be implemented immediately, especially after the control of Idlib and the signing of de-escalation agreements.
In February 2017, al-Jolani began a new round of fighting against a group of jihadists who considered the revolutionary factions apostate. They did not recognize the courts and judicial committees in northwest Syria, arguing they did not apply Sharia. Violent battles erupted between Hayat Tahrir al-Sham and the Aqsaa Brigade in Idlib and northern Hama, leading to dozens of casualties on both sides, with executions, suicide bombings, mutual shelling, and various armed confrontations.
The year before, the group had tried to absorb "Jund al-Aqsa" into its ranks after a conflict with Ahrar al-Sham. Al-Jolani had hoped to quietly dismantle Jund al-Aqsa within the al-Nusra Front (before the establishment of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham), but the group's members remained steadfast in their extremist views. Al-Jolani was forced to issue a statement declaring "Jund al-Aqsa’s lack of organizational allegiance to the al-Nusra Front" due to their refusal to comply with the pledge's terms, including the requirement of obedience.
In the end, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham declared war on Jund al-Aqsa, which had renamed itself the Aqsaa Brigade. After intense fighting, both parties agreed to create a safe passage for the Aqsaa Brigade members and their families to Raqqa, then under ISIS control. Some of them joined the Turkestan Islamic Party and other factions, while others reformed a new group named "Ansar al-Tawhid." The group later joined the "Al-Fath al-Mubin" operations room under Hayat Tahrir al-Sham and became part of its "military operations management," contributing actively to the battles for city liberation, including Hama, and entered Damascus as part of the factions involved.
Al-Jolani's Struggle with Jihadists
Another chapter of al-Jolani’s conflict with jihadists unfolded in Idlib in the summer of 2020. After three years of severe disputes and tensions between the Guardians of Religion Organization and Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, triggered by al-Jolani’s disassociation from al-Qaeda’s Ayman al-Zawahiri, questions regarding the legitimacy of the Sharia’s application, and the refusal of the Guardians of Religion to recognize the Salvation Government in Idlib, the disagreements reached an impasse. Hayat Tahrir al-Sham decided to dismantle the group in a less bloody manner. After a few days of limited clashes, the Guardians of Religion agreed to end their public presence in northwest Syria and dismantle their camps and checkpoints. The group's activities remain banned in areas controlled by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham.
Controlling the Jihadists
In reality, al-Jolani has successfully contained most jihadist groups in Syria within Hayat Tahrir al-Sham. Groups insisting on independence were forced to restrict their military activity within the Al-Fath al-Mubin operations room and recognize the Salvation Government as the political and service front in the liberated areas.
Al-Jolani did not allow the formation of jihadist alliances outside of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham and Al-Fath al-Mubin. When five jihadist groups—The Brigades of Ansar al-Mujahideen, the Jihad Coordination, Ansar al-Din Front, the Ansar al-Islam Group, and the Guardians of Religion Organization—announced the formation of a unified operations room called "Operation Thabetu" in June 2020, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham immediately moved to dissolve the new alliance and arrested several of its leaders.
In every clash between Hayat Tahrir al-Sham and the mentioned jihadist groups, the so-called "migrants' blocs" in the group (foreign jihadist factions loyal to the organization) are keen to affirm their loyalty to al-Jolani and the leadership of the group. These include prominent groups such as the Turkestan Islamic Party, the Uzbek Jamaat of Tawhid and Jihad, the Caucasian Army of Migrants and Ansars, the Sham Islam Movement (Moroccans), and the Albanian and Maldivian groups.
A number of leaders and members of jihadist groups are still held in Hayat Tahrir al-Sham prisons in Idlib. Many of them are those who refused to make settlements to pledge not to form new groups or conduct operations against Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, and to cease promoting takfiri ideologies. Among the most prominent is Abu Yahya al-Jaza'iri, a former leader in the Guardians of Religion. Many of the leaders and figures released months ago signed pledges not to publicly criticize Hayat Tahrir al-Sham and not to form new groups, such as Abu Dharr al-Masri, Abu Abdulrahman al-Makki, and Abu Shu’ayb al-Masri.
Jihadists in the New Syria
Abdul Rahim Atoun, the second in command of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, has played a key role in shaping the ideological and political transformations of the group over the years. He shares the same views as al-Jolani since the founding of al-Nusra Front, and it seems that the task of intellectually framing the jihadists in the new Syria will fall on his shoulders. However, there is no doubt that certain jihadist factions will struggle to absorb these new transformations, especially ideas related to minority rights, elections, relations with the international community, drafting the constitution, and engaging with Western countries, among other issues.
In this context, Ahmad Sultan, a researcher specializing in extremist groups at the Egyptian Enterprise for Policy and Strategic Studies, states, "The transformations of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham from al-Nusra Front through to its establishment came under the influence of the leadership elite, represented by al-Jolani." He added in a statement to Al-Hurra that "the organizational evolution of al-Nusra Front, including the split from ISIS and the severance of ties with al-Qaeda, leading to the formation of the group and its justification by al-Jolani’s close leaders and scholars."
Regarding the expected new transformations, which al-Jolani hinted at in his media appearances, Sultan said, "There are attempts by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham’s leaders and scholars to prepare the ground for them, but they will not please all jihadists. Some will oppose them and see it as a retreat from the jihadist convictions." The researcher emphasized that "Hayat Tahrir al-Sham has previously experienced splits due to its positions, but it remained cohesive. Al-Jolani and his close group from Binnish were able to maintain control over the organization." He added, "Despite some disagreements and promises, this opening will be justified by claiming that the full implementation of Sharia will take some time, and the group will adopt a rhetoric similar to the Muslim Brotherhood's, striving to avoid splits and fractures within its ranks."
Another dilemma awaiting Ahmad al-Shar'aa in the near future is the position of foreign jihadists in the new Syria. They number in the thousands, with some forming independent factions such as the Turkestan Islamic Party, Caucasians, and Tajiks. Will they be integrated into the government forces and affiliated with the Ministry of Defense? Or will they be disarmed and naturalized as Syrian citizens? It’s a thorny issue with many unanswered questions, and the world awaits to see how it will be handled.